As Russia’s upcoming parliamentary elections approach, a significant paradox within President Vladimir Putin’s regime has come to the fore. While there is little uncertainty regarding the election outcome, holding the vote remains crucial for the Kremlin. Putin’s authoritarian power is not constrained by elections, yet legitimizing his rule without public support is difficult. This tension forms the foundation of Russia’s “managed democracy.”
The ruling United Russia party—or pro-Putin factions—is expected to secure a majority in the State Duma, Russia’s lower house of parliament. Controlling the election results is not difficult; outcomes can be influenced through ballot rigging and loyal state media. However, if the rigging becomes so blatant that it starkly contradicts the public’s actual sentiment, it could inadvertently expose the regime’s weakness.
The case of the Yabloko party serves as an example of this apprehension. Last month, Russia’s Supreme Court barred this veteran liberal party from appearing on the Duma election ballot. Yabloko is not a powerful enough force to pose a direct, major electoral challenge to Putin’s government; the party last held representation in the Duma in 2007, though it retains some representatives at local and municipal levels.
Nevertheless, Yabloko’s stance is uncomfortable for the Russian government. The party opposes the war in Ukraine, and its election manifesto calls for a ceasefire, diplomacy, and peace. This is the first parliamentary election since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine began in 2022. Although the war was expected to end within weeks, it has dragged into its fifth year. Barring even a small anti-war party from participating in the election under these circumstances may signal the Kremlin’s anxiety regarding public support.
The impact of the war is becoming increasingly visible within Russia itself. As Ukrainian long-range missile and drone strikes hit infrastructure deep inside Russian territory, it has become difficult to fully shield ordinary Russian citizens from the scope of the conflict. Economic pressures—such as fuel shortages and inflation—are also undermining the effectiveness of government propaganda. While the exact number of Russian military casualties is difficult to ascertain, it is estimated to be around 1.5 million, with fears that several hundred thousand have been killed. Facing a shortage of volunteers, military recruiters are attempting to enlist people through coercion, compulsion, or deception. Officials have denied rumors regarding the large-scale deployment of reservists or a new round of mass mobilization following the election.
Amidst this situation, the Kremlin is further narrowing the already limited space for dissent. Political and administrative measures required to ensure an election outcome aligned with Putin’s expectations are already in place. Consequently, while there is little uncertainty regarding the result, the election is not entirely meaningless; for Putin, projecting an image of public support is just as crucial as the reality of that support itself.
The more effort the Kremlin expends to demonstrate Putin’s popularity through the election, the more its underlying insecurity is revealed. Although the Russian regime appears formidable and controlling from the outside, the need to suppress opposition, exclude anti-war factions from the electoral process, and manipulate results hints at vulnerabilities lurking beneath that facade of strength.
